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Commanding Officer Responsibilities and Actions

40. (U) The Commanding Officer shall require the Navigator to develop a plan for safe and accurate navigation. The CO shall approved the plan before getting underway. OP 61-17 Section 1.4.a. [encl (36)]

41. (U) The ship shall thoroughly brief appropriate members of the ship’s navigation and operational teams on each phase of the transit. NODORM Art. 5102.2.e. [encl (42)]

42. (U) The CO said the Operations Brief on 7 January 2005 "diedn't talk about voyage planning". Other Wardroom members, including the XO, confirmed this statement. [encls (4)-(8)]

43. (U) The CO said he did not discuss voyage planning for this transit with CSG-7 and had never done so on previous SUBNOTES. He assumed CSG-7 used Echo charts for planning. The CO believes "the ship is fully responsible for safe navigation, not CSG-7." [encl (4)]

44. (U) Per OPORD 2000, the Commanding Officer is required to submit SUBNOTE change requests under certain circumstances. There is no restriction regarding when the Commanding Officer may send such a request. App. 1 to Annex C [encls (39),(66)]

Navigator Responsibilities and Actions

45. (U) The Navigator is required to prepare a voyage plan for safe and prudent passage and use the Voyage Manager Program to lay out the ship's track. The Voyage Planning function of the Voyage Manager serves to generate voyage plans in port and display voyage plans at sea. OP 61-17 Sections 2.3.1.a, 2.3.1.d. [encl (36)]

46. (U) The CO expected the NAV to review all charts available for the areas of operations, select the best charts, and only present the recommended charts to the XO and CO for review and approval. [encl (4)]

Assistant Navigator Responsibilities and Actions

47. (U) The Assistant Navigator is required to ensure that all necessary navigational information is available and up-to-date prior to ship’s movements and must review and submit all prepared checklists, voyage plans, and prepared charts and Change 1
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publications to the Navigator for review prior to use. NODORM Art. 1102 Para. 2.i, Para. 2.k [encl (41)]

48. (U) "The Navigation Division Planned Operations Checkoff List (Art. 5114) is designed to prepare charts for operations outside piloting waters." NODORM Art. 5102.3.c. [encl (42)]

49. (U) SAN FRANCISCO's navigational chart at the time of the casualty, chart E2202, was corrected and up to date through the latest Notice to Mariners. [encls (43), (231), (234), (235)]

Operational Navigation Execution

General

50. (U) OP 61-17 Section 2.3.4 defines operations as either "in restricted waters" or in "open ocean." [encl (36)]

51. (U) CO Standing Orders caution the crew that "at no time should total confidence be placed in a single device or watchstander with regard to navigation." COSO 4, Art. 0430 [encl (35)]

52. (U) OP 61-17 Section 2.3.4.j(4) directs that "when approaching shallow water while submerged and when authorized by the Navigator, soundings shall be taken at intervals frequent enough to ensure that the ship will not proceed into dangerous water during the interval between soundings. Consideration must be given to the bottom contour being approached." [encl (36)]

53. (U) During open ocean navigation, OP 61-17 Section 2.3.4.a(6) requires the ship to evaluate "the worst case position with respect to shoal water or operating area constraints and projection of when action will be required based on best and worst case estimated position to avoid a red or yellow sounding." [encl (36)]

54. (U) CO Standing Orders state that "Unusual coloring of water" was one of the indications of shoal water. COSO 4, Art. 0455. [encl (35)]

55. (U) CO Standing Order 0420.a define operating in restricted waters as "operating surfaced or submerged within 10 NM of land, in shoal water or near other hazards to navigation." When submerged shoal water is defined as less than 100 fathoms (600
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ft.) deep. "Near other hazards to navigation" applies whenever within 2 NM of such hazards. [encl (35)]

56. (U) CO Standing Orders specify that when conducting operations in shallow water, the modified piloting party "shall be on station prior to entering within 10 NM of the 100 fathom curve and will remain stationed until greater than 10 NM from the 100 fathom curve." This is more conservative than the stationing requirements for normal operations (stationed prior to 10 NM from land or when operating in water less than 100 fathoms.) COSO 4, Art. 0410, 0420 [encls (35),(45)]

57. (U) OP 61-17 Section 2.3.3 provides the following guidance:

   a. "When operating in restricted waters during section steaming watches, proper caution must be exercised to safely navigate the ship... The Navigator will recommend, for the CO's approval, additional watch stations to be manned... to ensure safe navigation. The Navigator ANAV shall supervise the piloting party consistent with the navigation challenges facing the ship."

   b. "The OOD's navigational duties are as follows: The OOD underway shall keep himself continually informed concerning the geographic factors which may affect the safe navigation of the ship, and take appropriate action to avoid the danger of grounding... In no case shall the [OOD, the QMOW, and other watchstanders responsible to the OOD] hesitate to station or recommend stationing the full maneuvering watch piloting party or to request additional navigation personnel assistance." [encl (36)]

58. (U) OP 61-17 Section 2.3.4.a provides the following guidance: "Navigation in open ocean shall consist of the following elements: Periodic fixing by all available means and evaluation of fixes; Evaluation of position uncertainty; Continuous position keeping by recording and plotting at least three independent methods; Comparison and evaluation of the independent position keeping methods; Evaluation of worst-case position with respect to shoal water; Careful examination of charts; and Use of the Fathometer consistent with the nature of the bottom and the degree of accuracy to which the bottom topography is charted." [encl (36)]
59. (U) NODORM Art. 5108.2 states, "Written guidance in the Night Steaming Orders shall be thorough and not leave anything to chance." [encl (46)]

60. (U) "Open ocean navigational practices must be conducted within operational limits prescribed by the CO. These limits describe the safe navigational envelope of the ship and will normally be set forth by the CO in his night orders." OP 61-17 Section 2.3.4.b. [encl (36)]

61. (U) OP 61-17 Section 2.3.4.c directs that ship's position shall be fixed as often as required for safe navigation and that all fixes be evaluated by the Officer of the Deck and the Navigator (or Assistant Navigator) for accuracy and consistency. [encl (36)]

62. (U) Position uncertainty is a tool for the Officer of the Deck and the Quartermaster of the Watch to ensure the ship does not run aground. All plotted positions must remain within the position uncertainty circle. OP 61-17 Section 2.3.4.e. [encl (36)]

Officer of the Deck Responsibilities and Actions

63. (U) Per CO Standing Orders, the Officer of the Deck is the CO's direct representative in all matters related to the ship's operation. The Officer of the Deck remains responsible for safe operation of the ship even if a junior officer is stationed with the Conn. COSO 1, Art. 0100, 0120. [encl (44)]

64. (U) OP 61-17 Section 2.3.4h. requires the Officer of the Deck, in open ocean navigation, to "carefully check the intended track or operating areas on the charts in use for the period of his watch, looking for areas where shallow water or other navigational hazards exists sufficiently close to the track to represent a hazard." The Officer of the Deck is tasked to use both worst and best estimates of ship's position and to determine when action will be required to prevent receipt of a yellow or red sounding." [encl (35)]

65. (U) "With the advice of the NAV, the OOD is responsible for conning the ship to avoid grounding, collision, and other hazards. The OOD should call the Navigator any time he is in doubt of the ship's navigational safety." OP 61-17 Section 2.3.4.g. [encl (36)]
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66. (U) "The [OOD] shall... [e]nsure estimated positions from the ship's inertial navigation system and electronic DR are plotted on the chart at least every 30 minutes. Verify that the ship is not standing into danger... Ensure close attention is paid to the hourly compass checks... Ensure the Fathometer is used as required in accordance with the ship's prescribed policy... Ensure all opportunities to use the bottom topography for navigation purposes are exercised." OP 61-17 Section 2.3.4.h. [encl (36)]

67. (U) CO Standing Orders require the Officer of the Deck to "always remain aware of the water depth beneath the keel and what it will be along the track. There have been a number of instances of submarines running into mountain peaks or the shoaling Continental Shelf because of failure to change keel depth to fit the track." COSO 2 [encl (47)]

68. (U) CO Standing Orders require that the Officer of the Deck, "except when "Emergency Deep" is ordered, always take a sounding prior to proceeding to a deeper depth." COSO 2 [encl (47)]

69. (U) CO Standing Orders direct that the Officer of the Deck is "the duty NAV and as such is directly responsible for safely navigating the ship during his watch... When at sea and particularly when approaching land or shoal waters, the OOD shall keep himself continuously informed of the tactical situation and geographic factors which may affect the safe navigation of the ship and take appropriate action to avoid the danger of grounding." COSO 4, Art. 0405 [encl (35)]

70. (U) CO Standing Orders require the Officer of the Deck to review navigation records and position data as part of pre-watch relief process, including reviewing water depth, projected track, navigation hazards and expected soundings. COSO 1, Art. 0115. [encl (44)]

71. (U) The NAV was the OOD at 080945K January 2005 and did not review the last GPS fix prior to the ship going deep. [encls (6),(53)]

72. (U) The last military GPS fix received prior to grounding was at 080945K and was reviewed by an OOD under instruction. [encls (6),(53)]
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73. (U) CO Standing Orders require the officer of the Deck to obtain CO's permission before closing land closer than 14 miles or restricted waters closer than 10 miles. "Restricted waters" is defined as "operating surfaced or submerged within 10 NM of land, in shoal water or near other hazards to navigation," and further modified by the CO. [encl (35)]

Quartermaster of the Watch Responsibilities and Actions

74. (U) Safe navigation of the ship is the Quartermaster of the Watch's primary responsibility. NODORM Art. 2102. [encl (37)]

75. (U) Per NODORM Art. 2102.2.e Quartermaster of the Watch responsibilities include:

   a. Keeping required logs and records;

   b. Resetting the electronic DR source with the Navigator's approval;

   c. Operating the Fathometer to obtain a sounding with permission of the Officer of the Deck when any fix is obtained and at least every 30 minutes unless otherwise directed;

   d. Taking soundings prior to diving and prior to increasing depth as directed by the Officer of the Deck;

   e. Being careful to double-check all position plotting calculations and procedures;

   f. Ensuring that readings of the master RLGN and steering repeaters are compared every hour and ensuring that a simultaneous comparison of all installed heading sources and heading repeaters are made and recorded once each watch; and

   g. Obtaining a fix whenever possible by all available means.

   [encl (37)]

76. (U) CO Standing Orders require the Quartermaster of the Watch to "review the intended track for the watch plus two hours and determine the uncertainty in the ship's position based on fix expansion, checking for navigation aids, depth of water,
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submerged interference, hazards to navigation, shift in soundings, depth zones assigned, shifts in CSE/SPD/DEPTH etc. prior to relieving the watch. [encl (35)]

77. (U) Between fixes, the ship's estimated position shall be maintained using Hand DR (Dead Reckoning), inertial navigation and Electronic DR. Hand DR is the process of determining a projected position by manually projecting ship's course and electromagnetic (EM) log speed ahead from a known position. OP 61-17 Section 2.3.4.d. [encl (36)]

78. (U) OP 61-17 Section 2.3.4.j states "Keel depth should be commensurate with the available depth of water with consideration given to the proximity of shoals and position uncertainty. Soundings shall be obtained... and compared to the ship's plotted position at specific intervals including:

a. With each fix;

b. Prior to submerging and prior to a significant increase in own ship's depth when submerged; and
c. When operating in the vicinity of rapidly shoaling bottom gradients. In such case the Navigator shall reduce the specified sounding intervals such that at least three soundings are obtained before the ship enters within 1,000 yards of dangerously shallow water." [encl (36)]

79. (U) The Quartermaster of the Watch shall give prompt notice to the Officer of the Deck and Navigator if "any unexpected changes in soundings" occur. NODORM Art. 2102.2.a(4). [encl (37)]

80. (U) CO Standing Orders direct that if there is a discrepancy of 20% or more between actual depth and charted depth in water greater than 1000 fathoms the NAV is to be called Control and the COD, ANAV, XO, and the CO are to be informed." [encl (35)]

81. (U) Per CO Standing Orders, "RED, YELLOW and Minimum Expected soundings will be conservative and realistic, selected not only to avoid shallow water but also to provide timely alert to possible navigational errors." [encl (35)]
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82. (U) OP 61-17 Section 2.3.4.i directs "A check of the master heading source and steering repeaters shall be made and recorded every hour... A simultaneous comparison of all installed heading sources and steering repeaters shall be made and recorded once each watch." [encl (36)]

83. (U) Per CO Standing Orders, "all soundings taken will be timed using a headset and stopwatch, then compared to the digital readout and the chart recorder. All soundings will be reported to the OOD... and include a statement concerning actual water depth compared to charted depth." [encl (35)]

84. (U) The majority of BQN-17 soundings taken during the transit from Guam to the Caroline Islands 7-8 January 2005 were taken using aural/stopwatch method only. [encls (19),(48)-(52)]

85. (U) CO Standing Orders direct watchstanders to "use all available sources of fix information. Bottom contour navigate whenever sufficient variation in bathymetry exists to permit obtaining fixes." [encl (35)]

86. (U) Per watchstanders' statements, no bottom contour fixes were obtained or logged on 7 or 8 January 2005. [encls (4),(6),(19),(48)-(51),(53)]

87. Contrary to OP 61-17, the QMOW and OOD failed to identify and subsequently notify the NAV of two situations where RLGN estimated positions fell outside position uncertainty. Specifically, OP 61-17 states, "the purpose of position uncertainty is to provide a tool for the OOD and QMOW to ensure the ship does not run aground" and that it provides "a tripwire... to call the NAV to evaluate the navigation picture." [encls (36),(53),(59)]

88. (U) NAV Standing Orders Paragraph 3.a(2) require the Quartermaster of the Watch "to serve as [the NAV's] eyes and ears in Control. Do not rely solely on the judgment of the OOD... Make an independent assessment of the situation..." [encl (54)]

89. (U) QMOWs were directed to set up VMS with a variable range meter circle of 3NM radius when SSN-711 was operating in a MHN. [encl (54)]
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90. (U) MQOWs were directed to use Danger Areas to highlight shoal areas on VMS when operating in shallow water. No Danger Areas were set up on VMS for the Caroline Islands transit (ship's operations did not meet CO's definition of "operations in shallow water"). [encl (45),(54)]

91. (U) CO Standing Orders require the Sonar Supervisor to be aware of the navigation situation, back up the OOD, and be alert to changing external environments. [encl (55)]

92. (U) Electronic charts, including VMS, are not authorized as primary navigation reference material. SSM OP61-17 Section 1.2.1. [encl (36)]

93. (U) COMSUBPAC Readiness and Training Memorandum (RTM) 03-09 Paragraph 1 provides the following guidance: "The Voyage Management System and BPS 15H provide significant improvements in what can best be termed an "electronic seaman's eye." When properly utilized, these systems can provide a user interface that allows a Navigator or Conning officer to obtain an accurate, intuitive and graphical indication of the ship's real time and future position with respect to the approved navigational plan. VMS Mil 5.5.X is a first step towards the shift to Electronic Navigation, which will not be fully implemented until certification of VMS Mil 5.3. [encl (56)]

94. (U) RTM 03-09 Paragraph 2 states, "Prudent Navigation requires use of all available sources to fix ship's position. While the Mil 5.5.X software is not authorized for use as the sole Navigational plotting source, a ship is not utilizing a valuable tool if some basic capabilities of the BPS/VMS combination are not employed. When these systems are available, employment of their most useful capabilities should be considered mandatory for prudent Navigation and Contact Coordination. Primary capabilities, use of which should be considered mandatory when available, are as follows... The current Voyage Plan is loaded and running." [encl (56)]

95. (U) SAN FRANCISCO does not use RTM 03-09, which gives guidance for using VMS during piloting and while in open ocean. [encl (57)]

96. (U) NAV Standing Orders had not been revised since 20 November 2002 (current NAV and previous CO). No changes were made to NAV Standing Orders procedures for conducting a sail
closeout, even though a major incident causing equipment damage had occurred in August 2004 due to improper closeout and a ship's instruction had been issued to cover this process. [encl (54)]

Logkeeping Requirements

97. (U) Ship's Deck Log. In addition to the basic requirement to log significant circumstances and occurrences, the NODORM requires the Quartermaster of the Watch to ensure the Log is up to date and accurate before relieving the watch and requires compass checks to be logged. NODORM Art. 2102.2.c and 6101.3.j [encls (37),(58)]

98. (U) Ship's Position Logs. The NODORM establishes the following requirements for maintaining the Ship's Position Logs:

   a. Use a line entry when shifting logs and to log ship's track;

   b. That all fixes be evaluated by the Officer of the Deck and either the Navigator or Assistant Navigator, and that the evaluating individual initial alongside the entry in the remarks column;

   c. Log reset of Hand DR, DDRT Plotter or RLGN and that Officer of the Deck (or in unusual circumstances Navigation Watch) verify reset and initial in remarks column;

   d. Log total water depth with each logged ship's position and with each fix;

   e. That the NAV review the Position Log at random intervals daily indicated by line entry and signature.

   f. That the ANAV review the Position Log frequently (along with other navigational logs and reports) and indicate by initializing each page. (NODORM 1102, 6103) [encls (41),(58)]

99. (U) Ship's Fathometer Log. The NODORM requires all soundings to be taken with the ships fathometer and be recorded with associated times. The Assistant Navigator is responsible for reviewing and maintaining the Fathometer Log. NODORM 1102, 6103. [encls (41),(58)]
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100. (U) SAN FRANCISCO's Deck Log, Position Logs, and Fathometer Log for 071131K January 2005 to 081142K January 2005, contained the following deficiencies:

   a. Position Logs did not have the correct instruction posted in the inside of the front cover.

   b. 15 orders recorded in columns 23 - 40 of the Deck Log were not logged completed.

   c. 9 of 24 required compass checks were not conducted and logged in the Deck Log.

   d. 12 GPS fixes were not initialed in the Position Logs as having been reviewed.

   e. 26 soundings were logged in the Position Log as "Depth Beneath the Keel" vice "Total Water Depth" as required by NODORM Art. 6103.4.m.

   f. 4 soundings were logged in the Position Logs using incorrect values, one of which was initialed as reviewed by the Officer of the Deck, and one fix was logged and initialed as reviewed by the Officer of the Deck, without a sounding being recorded.

   g. On 10 occasions, the ship increased depth without taking a sounding or logging the sounding in the Fathometer Log.

[encls (58)-(61)]

SUBNOTE Processing

SUBNOTE Background Information

101. (C) OPORD 2000

[encl (33)]

(b)(1)

(b)(3)

102. (U) The SUBNOTE System is primarily intended for submarine accountability and safety (submerged interference) monitoring by the SUBOPAUTH. [encl (33)]

103. (U) COMSUBPAC OPORD 205 Pacific Local Operations (OPORD 205) states that the SUBOPAUTH shall "Review thoroughly the
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schedule and content of planned operations to verify that these operations:

   a. Are conducted within the ship's submerged operating envelope.

   b. Do not place demands on ship's force personnel that are inconsistent with the demonstrated state of training.

   c. Do not require the ship to operate at undue risk." [encl (40)]

104. (C) In OPORD 2000, COMNAVSUBFOR prescribes that "[redacted]" [encl (33)]

105. (C) In OPORD 2000, COMNAVSUBFOR states that within the PACIFIC FLEET area of responsibility, the [redacted] otherwise specified in the SUBNOTE. [encl (39)]

106. (C) OPSEC conditions are defined in OPORD 2000 and promulgated through SUBNOTES or OPSKEDs to give direction on how [encl (64)]

107. (C) OPORD 2000 states, [redacted]. [encl (64)]

108. (U) The CSG-7 Submarine Operational Directives/Checklist, CSG-7 OPSOP 302 CH-10 (OPSO 302) provides amplifying directions and checklists for use by the CSG-7 staff to prepare and approve operational directives including SUBNOTES. Specifically, OPSOP 302 provides procedures for generating and checking operational directives in support of submarine operations, exercises, transits and port visits. [encl (65), (63)]

109. (C) The WESTPAC Guide states, "[redacted]

   Change 1

   (b)(1) (b)(3)
In these cases, separate " " [encl (34)]

Approved SUBNOTE 001

110. (U) By CTF-74 040409Z JAN 05 (SUBNOTE 001) SAN FRANCISCO was assigned a SUBNOTE for the transit from the Guam Operating Areas (OPAREAS) to Brisbane, Australia for a port visit. This SUBNOTE is designated as CTF-74 SUBNOTE 001 for Calendar Year 2005. [encls (2),(4),(250)]

111. (C) SAN FRANCISCO was assigned a . [encls (2),(39)]

112. (C) The SOA of SUBNOTE 001 was . [encl (2)]

113. (U) SUBNOTE 001 did not provide any comments or remarks specifically addressing navigational hazards or precautions along the SUBNOTE track. [encl (2)]

114. (C) SAN FRANCISCO was assigned . [encl (2)]

115. (C) SUBNOTE 001 track from Guam to Brisbane started at [encls (2),(3)]

116. (C) SAN FRANCISCO was assigned . [encl (4)]
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Preparation and Approval Process

117. (U) The following CSG-7 personnel participated in the preparation, approval and back route of SUBNOTE 001:

   a. ET1(SS/SW) [redacted], USN, was designated as the responsible Electronics Technician (ET)
   b. ET1(SS) [redacted], USN was the ETNV (CSG-7 ANAV)
   c. LT [redacted] USN was the CDO
   d. LCDR [redacted], USNR was the under instruction Operations Officer (N31)
   e. LCDR [redacted], USN was the acting N31
   f. ET2(SS) [redacted], USN was the back route ET
   g. LT [redacted], USN was the back route CDO

[encls (2),(67)-(76),(83)]

118. (C) LCDR [redacted], USN, the current N31 and ETC(SS) [redacted], USN, the Quartermaster Division Leading Chief Petty Officer, were on holiday leave during the preparation and approval of the SUBNOTE 001. [encls (67)-(71),(74),(75)]

Qualifications and Lessons Learned

119. (U) The OPSOP 302 states that the same ET should be used for all related directives (e.g., SUBNOTES, OPSKEDS, Submarine Arrival Advisories, etc.) regarding a submarine transit to provide continuity. This individual is referred to as the "responsible ET." OPSUP 302 does not provide any qualification requirements for this ET. [encl (65)]

120. (U) ET1(SS/SW) [redacted] stated that the "responsible ET" could be any ET assigned to CSG-7. All members involved with processing SUBNOTE 001 agreed that there were no qualification or training requirements to prepare a SUBNOTE. [encl (76)]

121. (U) The CSG-7 QMOW qualification card requires qualifiers to draft two SUBNOTES and two SUBNOTE Changes. There is no qualification requirement to draft a SUBNOTE routing a submarine through restricted waters or straits. [encl (77)]
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122. (U) The CSG-7 Command Duty Officer (CDO) qualification card requires checking two U.S. SUBNOTES, There is no qualification requirement to check a SUBNOTE routing a submarine through restricted waters or straits. [encl (78)]

123. (U) The OPSOP 302 specifies that "designated officers" are to conduct the check of SUBNOTES before they are routed to the Current Operations Officer (N31) for release but does not specify how these officers are designated. The checklist block identifies "designated officers" as "LT/CDO". "Designated officers" is interpreted by CSG-7 personnel to mean a CDO qualified officer. There is no separate issuance that specifically designates these personnel. [encls (65),(78),(85)]

124. (U) The CSG-7 Current Operations Officer was unable to locate ET1(SS) QMOW qualification card. He reported that his predecessor said ET1(SS) completed a modified QMOW qualification card because some topics were waived due to previous qualifications. [encls (77),(79)]

125. (U) LT , LT , LCDR and LCDR are qualified CDO per the CSG-7 CDO qualification instruction. [encl (80)]

126. (U) The interview sheet for ET1(SS) CSG-7 ANAV certification and ET2(SS) QMOW qualification card were not available for review, but CSG-7 Staff has separately certified that both are qualified. [encls (77),(80),(81)]

127. (U) Per the CSG-7 CDO Qualifications, perspective CDOs are required to read the CDO Lessons Learned Binder. [encl (78)]

128. (U) CSG-7 does not have a required reading program that directs the periodic review of their lessons learned. [encl (87)]

129. (U) The CSG-7 CDO and QMOW Qualifications do not specifically require respective watchstanders to review the Sailing Directions within the CSG-7 AOR. [encls (77),(78)]

130. (U) OPSOP 302 does not require the "responsible ET" to review the CDO lessons learned binder before writing SUBNOTES

(b)(1) (b)(6)
for CSG-7 either for initial training or for actual drafting. [encl (65)]

131. (U) The CSG-7 Lessons Learned binder only contains six items with the oldest on dating back to 4 November 2003 and the newest entry dated 20 February 2004. [encl (88)]

132. (C) During interviews, they were described as This concept is . [encls (65), (67), (68), (77), (78)]

133. (C) Though discussed in several interviews, the practice of . [encls (65), (67), (68), (75), (77), (78)]

134. (U) GCCS-M is the Navy’s designated command-and-control (C2) system. GCCS-M provides the capability for a timely, accurate, and complete all-source navigational picture at ranges far beyond the capability of the ship’s navigational systems. GCCS-M allows the ship to view the navigational tracks of other ships and access real-time contact reports allowing for more accurate and safer navigation. [encl (82)]

135. (C) Per OPSOP 302, the ET, ETNV, LT/CDO and N31 are required to This is repeated in [encl (65)]

136. (C) The process of determining during the SUBNOTE preparation process is [encls (65), (77), (78)]

137. (C) The process of evaluating if a
Preparation and Approval Process

138. (C) Prior transits between Guam and Brisbane

139. (C)

140. (C) Review of SUBNOTEs through the area in the last five years,

141. (C) CSG-7

142. (C) A larger scale chart for the area covering the area of the Caroline Islands. Specifically,

143. (C) Per OPORD 2000, the SUBNOTE 001

144. (C) Per OPSOP 302, review of the

145. (C) CSG-7 staff members
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146. (C) Even though the CSG-7 Prevention of Mutual Interference Procedure, CSG-7 OPSOP 301 CH-3 (OPSOP 301),

OPSOP 301

[encl (89)]

147. (C) CSG-7 uses the CSG-7 AOR. The Navigational anomalies are entered into the . The practice is that the

identified, OPSOP 301

After

[encls (67)-(69),(72),(73),(84),(89)]

When a SUBNOTE is generated, the

This prompts the SUBNOTE preparer to

[encls (67)-(69),(72),(73),(84),(89)]

148. (C) OPSOP 302 directs a

[encl (65)]

149. (C) There was no discussion about using the

practice, CSG-7

[encls (65),(67),(68),(70),(71),(74)-(76)]

150. (C) Before drafting a SUBNOTE, the responsible ET is required to

[encl (65)]

151. (C) the acting Current Operations Officer,

[encl (71)]

152. (C) While preparing to develop SUBNOTE 001,
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Specifically he said, "..." [encl (67)]

153. (C) during his interview and said... He said they... [encl (68)]

154. (C)... [encl (67)]

155. (C) When asked about... [encl (67)]

156. (C)... [encl (68)]

157. (C) in his interview, when asked what... he stated that "..." [encl (69)]

158. (C) When asked about a... said that meant "..." [encl (67)]

159. (C) stated that... "and that "..." [encl (68)]

160. (C) stated that... would be... [encl (69)]
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161. (U) Track points, departure time, and arrival time were not changed after ET1(SS/SW) submitted draft SUBNOTE 001 to ET1(SS) for routing. [encl (76)]

162. (U) ET1(SS/SW) stated that he recalled phone calls from the SAN FRANCISCO ANAV, ETCS(SS) and ET1(SS) about getting a copy of their SUBNOTE. After several calls, ET1(SS/SW) sent a preliminary copy of the SUBNOTE to SAN FRANCISCO at 0802K on 4 January 2005. [encls (76),(90)]

163. (U) The preliminary SUBNOTE ET1(SS/SW) sent to SAN FRANCISCO only contained track points and times. These track points match those in SUBNOTE 001 that was transmitted. [encls (2),(75),(90)]

164. (U) Only ET1(SS/SW) talked with anyone onboard SAN FRANCISCO about the SUBNOTE. [encl (75)]

165. (U) ETCS(SS) received an email from SAN FRANCISCO about their SUBNOTE but was on leave before the actual SUBNOTE was transmitted. This email was sent on 2 January 2005 by ET2(SS) as directed by ETCS(SS). [encl (76)]

166. (U) When asked how he would treat the discolored water spot had he known it was there, ET1(SS) stated that "I would never drive over or near discolored water, I would drive around it" and that he considered discolored water to be shoals. [encl (68)]

167. (U) When asked how he would treat the discolored water spot, ET2(SS) stated "I would stay away from it" [encl (72)]

168. (U) When asked if he had seen chart 81023 during the SUBNOTE review process and if he would do anything different, LCDR stated that he would probably bias the track a little bit to the north of the discolored spot or consider another track. [encl (71)]

169. (U) When asked if he had seen the discolored water spot, what he would do, LT stated "If I had seen that I would have measured out the width of the moving haven and measured that from the track and taken a look, basically, at the area and