

Summary of interview of SK3 Feddler on 2/11/01

3 years onboard, 2 ½ years as helmsman, Battlestations helmsman, Maneuvering watch helmsman.

No material problems.

Digital deeper than master shallow (about 6 feet different) - consistent checked in operations previously.

P/D evolution

Cleared baffles to 120 from 340, turned right, at 150 feet.

A few minutes on 120, about 5 minutes, before going to P/D.

Went to 60 feet normal ascent, believe at A 1/3.

Got to 60 feet for about one minute then went to 58 feet, took a couple minutes fighting sea state. May have gone higher than 58 feet came up for high look around. Then ordered emergency deep to 400 feet directly. All orders came from OOD.

Ordered AII remained on course 120 at 400 feet then ordered left to 000, halfway around ordered to continue to 340°.

Had visitors in control (about 20 people) really crowded. Middle of turn asked to stand-up to put a guest on helm. About course 000 ordered emergency blow. Rudder amidship (instructed guest).

After gentleman (guest) sat down, Helmsman's hands were then removed rudder. But no delay in putting rudder amidship. Rudder amidship as immediate action not after an order.

OOD ordered 20° up by dive after blow actuated bow planed to full rise then 0'd, stern planes controlling angle. Both Helmsman and DOOW were touching helm to ensure positioned properly.

Paying attention to depth with rudder amidship. Right before broach noticed heading about 000; bow came down. Sound like water rushing down the sides then heard thump. Knew something was wrong, we had done these (Emergency Blows) a lot. Lots of VIP and dependant's cruises. They usually ask him up to drive. Pause then second thump, then heard something hit rudder, kind of knew we hit something. OOD raised scope Captain jumped on scope.

Guest vacated from chair as soon he heard thump. Visitors went out of control. CO was ordering OOD to turn ship around to go back and help out. CO was a bit panicky ordering OOD to get ship turned around. COS told Captain to calm down.

Multiple rudder orders, bell orders, including backing down. SK3 reports he made loud repeat backs to ensure OOD heard. Lot of people running around checking for damage and other things.

Planes, rudders, main engines working normally. NO problems staying on surface.

Summary of interview of CPO Streyle on 2/10/01

DOOW until relieved to assist personnel preparing to go topside. Prior to watch reviewed Emergency blow procedure about 1120 with OOD/COW. Relieved. Had a group of visitors in Control Room w/Engineer.

Shortly after Mr. Coen relieved and got permission to shoot waterslugs. VIPs were cycled through control stations.

Conducted depth changes with guests, maximum angle of $3 \frac{1}{2}$ degrees during any depth changes.

Chow went long to about 1245, prior to conducting angles and major depth changes all guests were removed from all control surface stations.

CO came to control discussing angels and dangles

Proceeded to 15, 25, 35° depth changes. Went back to 400 feet. Large rudder angles at high speed.

Captain discussed emergency blow process over 1 MC.

CO ordered OOD to take ship to 150 feet.

Cleared baffles. Went to P/D.

Brought ship to 60 feet (hovering between 60-62 feet). OOD did some searches. Held boat at 60 for majority of searches.

Excited, experienced at angels, emergency blows and large rudder. Had done 10-15 times.

CO took scope ordered through the OOD to come up to 58 feet. CO did some more searches (maybe went up to as high as 56.5 feet)

Ordered Emergency deep to 400 feet. AII answered on Emergency Deep. A 2/3 ordered close to 400 feet. Ship was at about 10 or 11 knots.

Did a rudder change to the right as we came down then ordered another rudder change to left (15°) believe to 320.

At about course north (just prior) order rudder amidships for emergency blow.

Emergency blow ordered by OOD. OOD directed 20° up.

No guest on planes through angles dangles or emergency blow.

Guest did diving alarm, 1 MC
Guest did EMBT actuators

Achieved 20° between 400 and 300°

Calling out depth every 50 feet.

When passing through 100 feet CO 1MC ship bow surfacing.

Between keel depth 60 and 50 feet, heard grinding sound.

As ship settled out heard second grinding sound further aft.

Told COW to be ready to prepare to surface. OOD ordered all stop.

CO, trying to get #2 scope raised.

Glanced at Perviz saw fishing vessel listing slightly to after port side. Then raised #1 scope. Paid attention to ship as they were ordering increased speed to try to bring the ship around.

COB came into control and asked DOOW what had happened, informed. Said I think we hit. Think we need to get FET open. COB apparently left.

CO on #1 scope telling OOD to get the ship turned, speeding up heard about wobble on shaft.

CO had VIPs directed to WR as scopes were being raised.

Got the ship steadied and on the surface. Prepared to surface. Sent messenger to get relief for DOOW

[b3/b6] relieved. As leaving control, order was given to drain and open lower escape trunk hatch about 1340 to 1415.

Does not recall any contact reports while going to P/D from Sonar, CO, OOD

No concerns about navigation picture. Soundings regular.

Qualified 3 years ago

Did not know ASVDU OOC.

Possible Problem w/radar after event.

In crews mess/COB calming people and doing evolution.

Manned phones

Drained and opened lower hatch

Two divers suiting up

Divers were directed by control of potential of going to sail and over side via rope ladder.

Two were divers suited up. These divers went to upper level. Two other divers came to crews mess and suited up.

Commenced draining upper hatch, rigged condom, never able to drain.

Word came down would not be going topside via FET

No Periviz in Crews Mess

Summary of interview with LCDR Meador on 2/13/01

Question: When did you go to the bridge?

Answer: In my stateroom at time of emergency blow. Heard abnormal shudder and went to control room. Observed CO turning over #2 scope to COS. Then scope was turned over to me for about 2 minutes. Fishing vessel still afloat saw one person moving forward on starboard side. Saw "UWAJIMA FISHERY-HIGH SCHOOL" on port side of fishing vessel. CO broadcast to control room to "Man the Bridge." Volunteered to get in a harness and man the bridge. Took Suitcase - tested lmc. Manned bridge with Lookout contacted OOD (Coen), ensured OOD and CO were ready to be relieved. Knew condition as All Stop and rudder amidships. On bridge < 5 minutes when divers and ladder arrived (Swanson/Rivas). Within 5-10 minutes bridge-to-bridge radio and CO on the bridge. CO reported location to Coast Guard, channel 16 (CO handled all reporting). Invisible to me if radio problems. Impression was comms with Coast Guard were happening. We were informed helo enroute (14 minutes ETA) and Vessel would be underway (45 minutes ETA). Helped divers rig the ladder. Got outboard going. Concerned about getting Low Pressure Blow going.

Appeared we had clear comms with Coast Guard before any helo or Coast Guard vessel appeared.

Saw approx. 7 liferafts.

Lookout was counting people and rafts and there were total of 8 liferafts. One was upside down.

Intense diesel smell, diesel fuel was all around.

Saw no people in the water.

Moved toward lone raft off bow. Wash from ship started to swamp raft. 2 occupants were visibly scared by this. About 30 yards away from raft. Concerned about having them ride up the bow and capsize. Ordered B 1/3, little affect. Bow planes were rigged-in before went to bridge. Went to back full, took way off ship and kept on bell to get a little sternway.

Received report of shaft wobble and shaft seals shifted to after seal.

Backed closer to second lone raft did not want to get to close. Shouted to occupant. Asked if he spoke English, waves too noisy to hear reply.

UWAJIMA FISHERY-HIGH SCHOOL

Reason initially believed Chinese vessel is lack of ability to differentiate between Chinese and Japanese writing on lifeboats.

Coast Guard helo flew around scene, that is all.

CO was trying to communicate quite a bit with 1st Coast Guard vessel when it arrived.

Question: How do you know Coast Guard had taken control of SAR?

Answer: Based on the fact that they were able to take meaningful, physical action.

Did not see anyone else in the water.

Had a lifering ready to throw had there been any people in the water and divers ready to go in the water.

Question: Did you drain lower FET hatch?

Answer: Unsure. Made 7MC we were still taking water over the upper FET hatch.

Question: Hypothetical, what would have been your actions if someone had fallen out of the raft?

Answer: Swanson would have gone in the water, helped person to their life raft and stayed in their raft.

Question: Would you have seen anyone swimming in view of weather and seas.

Answer: Yes.

Question: Did you see the ship when you first took the scope?

Answer: Yes, water had gotten up to fishing floats on the after deck. Stern was submerged, bow was coming up. Had gone to man bridge, did not see ship go under.

Question: Was RHI first Coast Guard vessel to appear, what did she do?

Answer: Yes, went from raft to raft spent bulk of time with larger group of life rafts.

Question: Why do you think the one raft was upside down?

Answer: Don't know, it was that way when I got to the bridge.

Question: Any thought that wave action flipped raft and someone was in it?

Answer: No.

Question: Did you make an assumption that all the rafts were visible?

Answer: Definitely not an assumption. We could see all the rafts there were. Action of seas was not causing material, rafts and debris, to drift significantly. Seas were mixed, could not create a dry deck or safe lee with multiple efforts on many courses and use of the outboard.

To get people from raft to sail would have risked too much, they were safer where they were.

Coast Guard had them all on board within an hour.

There was a point when Coast Guard asked us to stand off due to our ship's affect on seas. At the time we were about 100 yards from Coast Guard vessels, rafts were on the other side of the Coast Guard vessels, they had transferred all personnel to the two Coast Guard vessels.

Throughout afternoon watch SSN continued to circle the area. Coast Guard brought out C130 and Dauphin helo. Continued to search in the immediate area even as Hawthorne 5 and 8 arrived.

On Midwatch, we were not part of the search pattern but continued to search with night vision goggles. Saw LAKE ERIE, SALVOR and two Coast Guard cutters searching.

Don't feel we ever stopped the search.

0600 moved within 12 miles enroute PH. Turned over NVG to relief at 0530. We continued searching until we were entering into the harbor.

We stayed outside of the immediate search box.

Events Prior to SAR Phase:

Assigned as Tour Guide.

Not in control room for angles, high speed maneuvers, P/D or emergency blow.

Took tour group up to control about 1315, remained in rear of control room for 5 minutes (estimate). Left Conn about 1320 to return to stateroom.

Question: Was radar out of commission.

Answer: Don't know the answer. Early after manning the Bridge, Contact Coordinator asked for radar raised, said "no" did not want to loose visual arc.

Furuno was rigged during evening watch, including the repeater on the bridge.

Concerning BSY-1 Active:

To use HF sonar causes you to lose a console (one of two) in sonar.

Console in Control allows use of under ice functions only, cannot use as a 'third' console for HF active.

Not aware of any passive mode for under ice console in control room.

While on bridge had periscope operator look at and check on people in rafts for signs of injury. Reported one person of those visible laying in one raft, all others were sitting up. Directed Contact Coordinator to maintain a Geoplot picture of the rafts.

Concerning DV cruise:

DV cruise agenda was standard for GREENEVILLE.

Question: Were amount of evolutions for 6 hours reasonable?

Answer: If you look at timeline we really did not have that much planned. We weren't really doing that much.

Summary of interview conducted on 2/11/01

Why was he on board?

1. Former CINC requested a cruise for guests, wanted to represent Submarine Force (to present a broader perspective than the CO could) with associates of former CINC.
2. Interested in seeing ship GREENEVILLE due to reputation.
3. Engineer is Son-in-law. See how ship was run - all in all favorably impressed.
4. Ride time

Not in control when they submerged.

No reason to consider ship had problems.

Once collision occurred Captain knew his role onboard had changed.

Told CO very specifically we need to conduct a SAR effort right now and get reports made right now.

Went to control room shortly before angles and high speed turns. Crew had been in port for a while and wanted to keep an eye on things. During this period Captain was in the after part of the control room, port side vicinity of bottom sounder.

Positioned and especially focused on professionalism of ships control party. Not in a position to see fire control or sonar.

Regarding ASVDU:

Knew it was OOC and had been in Sonar earlier to see how things were being done.

Observed that the ship's Sonar LPO was new guy on board. He was not the sonar Supe observed.

Sonar Supe (during the morning watch) was knowledgeable and trusted by the crew. Experienced, had made the last WESTPAC.

Sonar watchstanders

3 operators in sonar on morning watch.

At 400 - 500 feet,

Ship conducted angles and rudder turns professionally, CO did a good job of working as a team. Impression was they knew how to operate the ship. OOD looked like he had done this before.

CO positioned the OOD behind the DOOW for high speed turns.
Then CO said we need to get to P/D:

Ship was at 150 feet

OOD reported to all stations making preps for P/D via MC
Don't remember all 3 stations (Sonar, ESM, Radio) acknowledging
Observed XO was in control room and was aware that purpose was
to go to P/D, check clear then conduct an emergency surfacing.

While preparing to go to P/D, I believe the ship had two sonar
contacts. CO was on the conn and had seen XO in the control
room.

Upon reflection, sense is that CO was very confident in his own
abilities and may have been pushing the OOD. When asked for
impression CO was comfortable in this element. OOD was
sensitive to presence of CO.

Believe the ship cleared baffles, did not monitor ranging
maneuvers. Did not hear what reports OOD made to CO before
going to P/D.

Recalls no report of close contacts when at P/D.

Saw at least 3 sweeps by OOD, no contacts reported

Ship's depth was changed for a high look. Heard no reports of
contacts or visibility.

OOD and CO only on the periscope. Got the impression of a
deliberate visual search.

Knew we were in assigned water.

Impression was no unnecessary delays in getting the emergency
surfacing event done after being at P/D.

There were guests on EMBT actuators and diving alarm. When
asked, Captain did not know there was a guest on the helm until
interviewer told him.

After collision took one brief look through periscope and went
to higher priority actions. Never saw anyone in the water
except in the life rafts. Saw debris. Saw ship was sinking.
Turned scope over to another operator. Went to ensure comms to
CSP/CG/CPF on HICOM. Collision at sea, Boat Sinking, standing
by for SAR. Guided CO to calm and conduct SAR.

AOB of FV was port 135 when Captain looked through the scope.

Heard there was difficulty communicating with personnel in rafts due to language.

Actively pursued SAR efforts in ship. Kept VIP's apprised of situation and communicated with CSP via HICOM periodically with updates.

Beginning of summary interview conducted on 2/13/01

Never sensed OOD had abrogated responsibility to CO.

Went to Radio ensured Comms. Told someone to escort DV's from Control Room. Promptly returned to control to the scope, looked saw that ship had sank, a number of life rafts and no - repeat - no people in the water. People were in rafts. Some were visible through raft cover flaps. Cognitive thought that ship, was holding on the surface as a check before manning the bridge, that he would not have step in and intervene. When asked, ship did not follow normal steps for manning the bridge. (i.e. ship was secure on surface, rushed to man bridge for SAR efforts).

Appeared manned in less than 5 minutes observation was that the bridge was manned as fast as humanly possible.

Observed rapid actions for ladder, comms, lookouts, bridge-bags to bridge. Early on cognitively saw personally that sea state would not support pulling life rafts closer to ship or putting people in water or topside. But they were ready to. Cranial helmets in crews mess, medical laid out in WR, would have committed if had seen anyone in the water - but did not, all were obviously safely on rafts though traumatized.

Cognitive of people in control room ready to go assist.

Did not focus on log taking or data collection. Concerned with ship stability, SAR, proper actions, well being of CO and team, reporting and VIP's.

No idea capacity of rafts, SWAG 10.

Summary:

There was no one swimming or hanging on to outside of rafts that would have compelled sending diver into water but ship was prepared to.

We knew very quickly that Coast Guard was enroute. Knew this because went to radio and was patched via CSP directly to N3. Told him exactly the situation. N3 responded they would take it. Minds eye, 20-25 minutes for Coast Guard helo to arrive.

When asked, Coast Guard helo comms gave assurance when rescue vessels would arrive.

When asked - hindsight - what would have been utility of having people enter the water to go to rafts and provide first aid vice waiting. Sea state strength would have required significant

thought, strength of diver, risk to people. Liferrafts weren't all lashed together, spread out. When asked, several hundred yards across span of rafts. No people in the water, other than liferafts appropriate vessels were in route.

Question: Were there liferafts on board?

Answer: Did not direct they be used. Thought was would not commit sailors to the water with risk from conditions. Commensurate with known arrival of Coast Guard and several hours of daylight remaining.

When asked does not know if megaphone was used. There were language barriers.

Question: If 90 miles of OAHU vice 9 what would have been done different?

Answer: Know you will not get help quickly. Assuming same conditions, you will have to take more risks, perhaps get them on deck.

Ship stayed in the area. When Coast Guard arrived, SSN was asked to clear away.

Question: When close to the ship, how did ship prevent damaging rafts?

Answer: No knowledge. Outboard was used. Engines were used.

Recollect that a raft report 20-30 feet off the bow was the closest ship got to the rafts. Ship was cognizant of being among rafts. Felt comfortable ship was not putting rafts in danger.

Please discuss when Coast Guard arrived.

Can't answer cognitively if Coast Guard put people in the water from helo.

Statement, recognize I was having to spend time reassuring DVs. On occasion reassuring them we were okay, gave updates. They were very concerned, some crying. Cognitive of potential downstream affects on them.

Question: Did you or did ship inform Coast Guard the status of putting ship's divers in the water?

Answer: No I did not, not know if ship did.

Question: After knew survivors had been picked up, what was ship focus?

Answer: Stay in area and search for people. Taking care of people on board. Ensuring own ship stability based on impact.

Question: Was there a search plan?

Answer: I was not presented and did not ask. Coast Guard was there and they had clearly announced they were in charge.

Question: Was ship's radar used?

Answer: Furuno had to be used. Believe ship's primary radar was out of service.

Question: Was there any direction the ship could steer to minimize wash over the deck?

Answer: Don't know.

Comment: Remember ship had limited propulsion due to reported shaft out of round. Ship does not ride as well slow. Spraying to bridge.

Comment: Ship was aware of SAR effort and where they were operating overnight, after survivors picked up by Coast Guard.

Night eyes, light intensifier were operational and being used.

Question: When did ship stop SAR efforts and shift to entering port?

Answer: Around Dawn.

Comment: Took on responsibility of working with DVs to let them pass word back to the beach. Not trivial. Took time and peoples anxiety was high. Took on this task to prevent from being a ship responsibility. Spent time ensuring CO, XO, OOD and crew functional, not traumatized and stable.

Comment: Made cognitive decision that CO was able to bring ship back to port and operate on surface.

Question: After report of propulsion limited to < A 2/3 did the ship minimize times above?

Answer: Yes, to my knowledge.

Question: Did ship have any indications of being damaged?

Answer: They reported shaft rotation out of round and shaft seals shifted. I personally checked shaft seals shortly after collision for safety.

Comment: At no time felt he was having to take over for the CO. Encouraged some actions and checked on his stability frequently.

Question: Did ship give any direction to Coast Guard helo?

Answer: There were comms w/helo, not sure content.

Question: Did anyone on the ship no Japanese?

Answer: I had heard that a crewman spoke Japanese, but he was on the beach.

Question: Would sea state swells along hull and curvature have allowed bringing liferafts safely alongside?

Answer: Considerable risk of capsizing the liferafts and jeopardizing ship's crew put topside to effect transfer.

Summary of interview of FT3 Brown on 2/14/01

Interest in period last hour before collision.

Question: There is a lot of confusion on role in control room.

Answer: Just in control waiting for the maneuvering watch.
Back by TAC 3.

Question: Do you remember the OOD telling you to warn him of close contacts?

Answer: That happened before lunch when I gave FT1 Seacrest a cigarette break. Think because we had been doing a lot of close aboard trainers.

Question: Did you ever operate panels?

Answer: No.

Question: Did you ever look over FTOW shoulder while he was operating the panel?

Answer: I could not because of number of people in control, Seacrest was on furthest aft panel.

Question: Do you think any guest were not in control?

Answer: Believe they all were at least a majority.

Question: Do you remember comms during P/D evolution?

Answer: Normal reports and comms as I recall.

Question: Do you remember when CO was looking in a sector?

Answer: Don't remember that happening well.

Question: Did you do anything different. DV

Answer: No.

Question: Was P/D as deliberate as usual?

Answer: Two contacts on left, drawing left believe one on right in the baffles opening not an unusual evolution.

Question: Do you remember console alignment?

Answer: Believe OPSUM and TB but don't remember order.

Summary of interview of STSSN Rhodes on 2/14/01

Interested in hour before the collision.

Question: What watch were you?

Answer: Since not qualified PBB I was sitting U/I on Workload Share under STS1 Reyes and Sonar Supervisor.

Question: How long have you been onboard?

Answer: Since August, second underway. Not qualified PBB. I was just learning to take logs. Working on first qual.

Question: You were being supervised by STS1 Reyes?

Answer: Yes, he was walking in and out and keeping an eye as well as Sonar Supe. Reyes was not really on the watch, he was walking in and out. He was in pretty much the whole time the hour before. He was there voluntarily.

Taking to DEMON, determining basic RPM, etc. Those are basic functions easy to do.

Brings up DEMON on upper display only, however bottom display remains looking at opposite Des the PBB operator. Takes about Less than 5 minutes with DEMON called up to get information.

During the period had no class information, not that I an recall contacts S-10, S-12 and S-13 because they were quiet. Believed quiet or possibly too much noise in the water, from fish or other.

Think Active Sonar was available. Active Sonar sends out sound energy which will allow the SONAR active operator to get a return signal of any contact. PBB is a passive detection in which you listen to what is in the ocean and by going active PBB ability to detect is reduced greatly.

Summary of interview with LT Pritchett on 2/14/01

Interested in hour before the collision:

I was in control within that period. After lunch taking people around, had been in and out of control. Tried to suggest for people (guests) to go to Control for emergency blow.

Saw Mr Coen doing Periscope depth initial safety sweeps. 3 low power 360° sweeps seemed about right time (8 seconds) then called out no close contacts. Overheard, initial depth 60 feet. CO ordered 58 feet. Once he was on the scope.

CO was on the scope for about one minute but don't know powers, I was back port side by fathometer did not see if Periviz was on.

Does not remember any direction to sensor operators or FC operators. Remembers OOD turning down EWR speaker. Don't remember CO and watchstanders communicating a deliberate search down bearings of contacts, thinks he would have remembered this if it happened.

Left control after emergency deep. Returned to control for sounding diving alarm, civilian sounded, and emergency blow. Recalls brief time, about 5 minutes, between Emergency Deep and Emergency Surface.

Remembers civilian on diving alarm and actuators, being helped by watchstanders.

Remembers scrapping noise, looking for flooding, 1MC about collision by CO after collision 10-15 minutes supervising breaking out of divers, topside, line handling equipment in crew's mess. Saw the vessel sinking on TV in Crew's Mess for about 20 sec.

Became Contact Coordinator on #2 scope (type 18) primarily another officer on #1 scope (type 2) higher height of eye, when ENG was on bridge about 20 minutes, remained with exception of meal break. Both scopes searched for survivors almost all of the time.

Was on the scope, never saw the vessel.

Weps, RCA, [(b3/b6)], [(b3/b6)] P-ENG) and [(b3/b6)] were off the ship.

Using scope primarily to look for people in the water, but saw rafts, four kind of grouped together. Another group of 3 close together with one turned over a separate single raft separate (8 total)

Think between both scopes we would have seen if any people were in the water.

Night image intensifier was in commission and was used, on occasion, through evening watch.

On evening watch BPS-15 attempted to rotate and radiate. Remembered looking at screen and it was not functioning properly.

After a while rigged commercial radar and operated after fixing a 90° offset.

ASVDU was found to not be operational on maneuvering watch leaving port Friday morning, STS1 Holmes came and said card replacement was an option but would require disabling screens in sonar and not recommended. Decided along with Sonar Officer to troubleshoot upon return to port.

Because ASVDU was OOC, If I were OOD I would have gone to sonar and made more frequent looks at screens. Don't believe any Temporary Standing Orders or supplementary orders existed for operating with the ASVDU OOC.

60 to 80 percent of guests in control during the Emergency Surface.

During battle stations, people are aft by lots and stbd by Fire Control Screens. This evolution people (civilians) were more forward port (by BCP and SCP) and forward (by CEP Plot) of periscope stand.

Believe ship was accommodating presence of guest correctly.

What I saw of ascent to P/D was quiet. (During 3 low power sweeps and OOD calling "No Close Contacts").

Summary of interview with YN2 Quinn on 2/14/01

Onboard 1 month, submarine qualified

Was not necessarily a tour guide, just followed them around tending them.

Estimate about 80 of crew were onboard

Had been in control for all angles and dangles, periscope depth, emergency deep, emergency surfacing. Believes all people (guests) in control for evolutions (observation).

During actual emergency blow there was a guest on the helm. CO had asked one guest if he would like to have the helm. Helmsman hands were no more than 1-1.5 feet at any time. Guest on diving alarm, just pushed the button. Guest on actuators.

CO briefed guests they could not be loud in control, noise level was not apparently a factor. Did not think it would interfere with watchstanders.

Concerning P/D evolution and preparations. From what I remember, if you had a SOP of periscope evolution, it would have been right down the line. Sonar reports, dive reports. OOD did not see anything. CO did not see anything they had Periviz on, don't remember if screen for COW was on for

Had a clear view of Monitor above FC station, all I saw was skies and ocean. Saw on ship, scope was well clear. Sky was gray, black and white screen.

Did not appear that either CO or OOD focused in a particular area. Heard both called no close contacts. Believe while at P/D sonar reported same thing about no close contacts, unsolicited, could have been an acknowledgement.

With regard to Emergency Deep:

Impression was about 5-7 minutes between emergency deep and emergency blow. CO positioned the guest, short brief and did blow.

DOCUME. RY EVIDENCE

Article 1207 Requirement	Records Collected	Envelope	Start Date/Time	End Date/Time	# Pages	Class
1. Deck Log	Deck Log	1	2/9/01 0000W	2/10/01 1047W	17	C
2. Bell Book	Bell Book	1	2/9/01 0753W	2/10/01 1045W	2	C
3. Engineering Log	Engineering Log	1	2/9/01 0000W	2/10/01 0847W	4	C-RD
4. Chart in Use	Collect all charts for UW Chart Overlays (if used)	2	Chart 19339	Note - Chart was scrubbed		
5. Bearing Book	Position Log (NODORM Art 6103) Primary Bearing Book/ Secondary Bearing Book (NODORM Art 6105)	3	One Overlay 1/30/01 0220W	Note - Overlay was scrubbed 2/9/01 1445W	1 Book	C
6. Magnetic Compass Record	N/A - No longer required by NODORM (Compass checks should be logged in Deck Log)	3	12/19/00	2/10/01	1-Pri 1-Sec	C
7. Deviation Data, azimuth records and course recorder records (to include SINS printout if installed)	Navigation Workbook (NODORM Art 6104)	3	1/18/00	2/10/01 (Note: No entries since 12/31/00)	1 Book	U
8. CIC Logs	ESGN Printout (if RLG, obtain data files)	3	2/9/01 0714W	2/10/01 1147W	2 rolls	C
	Master Contact Log	5	2/9/01 0836W	2/10/01 1009W	5	U
	Sonar Log (Manual)	5	2/9/01 0847W	2/10/01 1021W	21	C
	Sonar Log (ARCI Printout)	5	2/9/01 1140W	2/10/01 1526W	79	C
	Contact Evaluation Plot	5	2/9/01 0800W	2/10/01 1030W	2 rolls	C
	ESM Logs	5	2/9/01	2/9/01	1 page No data	C
	Sound Velocity Profile	5	2/9/01	2/9/01	1	C
9. Radar Logs	FCS Time-Bearing Printouts	5	2/9/01	2/9/01	4	C
10. DRT Plot (should be annotated w/ DRT Operator's name and scale used for the plot)	Radar Log (NODORM 6121) Geoplot	5	Radar not in use prior to or at time of incident 2/9/01 1345W	2/9/01	2 sheets	U
11. Bridge and CIC maneuvering board worksheets (signed and dated by the individual whose work is reflected)	Maneuvering Boards (if using plastic, take picture of any maintained)		None completed			
12. Photographs of bridge and CIC status boards (if possible, should be done immediately after the incident so the boards show data at the time of the incident)	Take Photos if not done by ship		All Status Boards scrubbed - no data available. Photos not taken immediately after incident			

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DOCUME. RY EVIDENCE

13. Radar Plot	Was Geoplot or Secondary Nav Chart manned for contacts?				Radar not in use prior to or at the time of the incident.		
14. Communications and Signal Logs	Communications Logs (NODORM 6114)	5	2/9/01 1400W	2/9/01 1736	4	U	
15. All messages on the incident (classified and unclassified from every net, whether transmitted or received)	Retrieve all message traffic from RMC	6	Various		14	C	
16. Bridge, CIC and Engineering Standing Orders and Night Orders	COSOs (All)	7	Copy provided				
17. Fathometer record	Engineer's Standing Orders	7	Copy Provided			C	
	Fathometer Log (NODORM 6106)	4	2/9/01 0800W	2/10/01 1035W	5	C	
18. Any audio or video tapes that recorded any aspect of the incident	Any audio or video tapes that recorded any aspect of the incident		Nothing recorded				
19. Damage Control Reports	Damage Control Reports		DCC not manned				
20. Records on training and qualifications of individual watchstanders on the bridge, in CIC and in the engineroom	Training Records (NODORM 6115) Qual Records for All in Control, Sonar, Maneuvering, ESM/Radio, Nav Sup Officer Training, Piloting Briefs, OPS Brief for UW, DOOW/COW Training, Helms/planes Training, ST/FT Training	8/9	Trng Records: Officer, CS Dept, Nav Dept, Sonar Sup, ST, FT, Nav, Ship Control		Qual Records	U	
21. Other Items Collected	OOC Red Status Log	6	2/9/01		2	C-RD	
	Pre-UW Checklist (if UW was 2/8)	4	2/9/01		5	U	
	Piloting Preparations Checklist	4	2/9/01		2	U	
	Planned Operations/ Navigation Checklist	4	2/9/01		2	U	
	Navigation Division Entering Restricted Water Checkoff	4	2/10/01	Not done on 2/9/01	1	U	
	Plan of the Day	6	2/9/01	2/9/01	1	FOU	
	NSSC Weekly Schedule	6	2/5/01	2/11/01	1	C	
	CTG 14.5 Weekly OPSKED 06-01	6	(310033Z JAN 01)				C
	NAVSTA - Pearl Harbor Movements for 07FEB-20FEB	6	(072335Z FEB 01)				U

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