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DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
COMMANDER
U.S. FLEET FORCES COMMAND
1562 MITSCHER AVENUE SUITE 250
NORFOLK, VA 23551-2487

5830
Ser N00/C016
25 Jul 08

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FIRST ENDORSEMENT on RADM F.M. Drennan ltr 5830 of 1 Jul 08

From: Commander, U.S. Fleet Forces
To: Commander, U.S. Pacific Fleet

Subj: COMMAND INVESTIGATION INTO THE FIRE THAT OCCURRED
ONBOARD USS GEORGE WASHINGTON (CVN 73) ON 22 MAY 2008

Ref: (a) COMPACFLT ltr 5830 Ser 00/0692 of 9 Jul 08

Encl: (179) RADM R.J. O'Hanlon's ltr 5800 of 24 Jul 08

1. Based on your request in reference (a), I assigned RADM R. J. O'Hanlon to review Immediate Superior in Command (ISIC) adherence to TYCOM directives and guidance, processes, oversight and follow-up, particularly as they related to damage control training and preparedness. This endorsement is limited to the specific issues raised in reference (a), and not to the command investigation as a whole.

2. Enclosure (179) to the command investigation is hereby forwarded. I concur with RADM O'Hanlon's review, and concur in his additional findings of fact, opinions, and recommendations, subject to the following comments.

3. Inadequate or inappropriate oversight by the ISIC and/or TYCOM cannot be substantiated to be a direct factor in the causation or appropriate response to the fire. Most identified deficiencies from unit basic level training and certification that were reported to or known by the ship and ISIC had been reported "corrected" to the ISIC by the ship's Commanding Officer before the fire occurred. However, RADM O'Hanlon's review articulates a need for increased vigilance by leadership and enhancement of damage control training and material readiness. Current processes for TYCOM evaluation and certification of carrier readiness at the end of "basic level training" that is based on an average of the carrier's

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performance across the entire spectrum of war fighting skills may mask weaknesses in particular areas. A more deliberate approach by the TYCOM, prioritizing required demonstrated skills, should be implemented. Further, greater attention must be focused on correcting critical deficiencies in individual areas relevant to critical basic skills, particularly in damage control. As part of their rigorous evaluation, ISICs must require and forward plans of action to address deficiencies or weaknesses noted by the Afloat Training Group at the end of the Final Evaluation Period to the Type Commander. The Type Commander must: (1) ensure submission of identified required reports (and POAM as appropriate) prior to certification that the carrier is ready to proceed to "integrated training"; (2) identify and evaluate performance and resolve negative trends; and (3) clearly state the convincing and compelling rationale for concluding that significant or critical deficiencies have been properly addressed.

4. I believe that it would be appropriate for Commander, Naval Air Force to review the unit level training program to determine whether established standards of "proficiency" and "effectiveness" are sufficiently rigorous, and to determine whether more complex and robust formal or shipboard damage control training is required in "basic level training phase."

5. Thank you for the opportunity to endorse this investigation. I look forward to reviewing and addressing relevant areas of the completed investigation.


J. W. GREENERT

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