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R 310900Z JAN 01 ZYB PSN 205864E25
FM COMSUBPAC PEARL HARBOR HI//00//
TO RUAYIAA/COMSUBGRU SEVEN//00//
RHWIGNA/COMSUBGRU NINE//00//
RUWDLBA/COMSUBDEVRON FIVE SAN DIEGO CA//00//
RUHEMDI/COMSUBRON ONE//00//
RUHEMDL/COMSUBRON THREE//00//
RUHEMDO/COMSUBRON SEVEN//00//
RUWNAWW/COMSUBRON ELEVEN//00//
RHWIGNH/COMSUBRON SEVENTEEN//00//
RUBDPLA/NAVIMFAC PEARL HARBOR HI//00//
RUHEMDZ/NSSC PEARL HARBOR HI//00//
INFO RHHMDBA/COMSUBPAC PEARL HARBOR HI//002/00W/01W//
RHHMHAA/CINCPACFLT PEARL HARBOR HI//01//
RHHMHBA/CINCPACFLT PEARL HARBOR HI//01//
RHHMDBA/COMSUBPAC PEARL HARBOR HI//00//
BT
[redacted]//N05050//

UNCLASSIFIED

MSGID/GENADMIN/COMSUBPAC//
SUBJ/COMSUBPAC TRAVEL//
RMKS/1. ([redacted]RADM KONETZNI WILL DEPART TAD 310900W JANUARY 2001 TO SEOUL, KOREA, CHINHAE, KOREA, YOKOSUKA, JAPAN, AND TOKYO, JAPAN AND WILL RETURN 111800W FEBRUARY 2001.
2. (U) CAPT S. J. MACK, CSP N9, WILL BE ACTING COMSUBPAC FROM 31 JANUARY UNTIL 1 FEBRUARY 2001. CAPT R. L. BRANDHUBER, CHIEF OF STAFF, WILL RETURN ON 1 FEBRUARY, AND WILL BE ACTING COMSUBPAC.//
DECL/X4//
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EXHIBIT 1 OF 1
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PERISCOPE CONTACT OBSTRUCTION BY SEA STATE

(U) Recent observations during PCO operations indicated that a surface warship could approach unacceptably close without being observed visually through the periscope until the surface warship was within 2,000 yards. Upon review of the data, we believe this occurred due to the ship taking periodic observations from the troughs of prevailing seas that coincided with the periodicity of the waves.

(U) Reviewing from Bowditch, the length from peak to peak of a trough is related to the period of the wave and described by the following equation $L = 5.12P^2$, where L is the length in feet and P is the period in seconds. The angle below which a visual observation can be obscured by the wave height can be approximated as $TAN\ \theta = (H - e)/2L$, where H is the wave height, and e is the amount of exposed periscope in feet. This is shown graphically in Figure 5.

(U) Consider a typical condition of an observation made from the trough of a 12-foot sea with an 8-second periodicity and 3 feet of scope exposed. The angle of obstruction is about 3°. Under this condition a ship with a 100-foot masthead height could go unobserved until within 700 yards even though our rules of thumb would predict a visual range of greater than 20,000 yards.

(U) Understanding this phenomenon is important and suggests several precautions. Upon arrival at periscope depth, assess wave height (Bowditch has tables for predicting wave height based on sea state observations). The larger the wave height, the greater the potential for obstruction. Remain aware of nominal scope elevation. Periscope operators should understand that if they are maintaining a positive elevation on the scope, they may be looking up at the peak of the wave vice the horizon. Taking an occasional "high look" will also help prevent surface visual contacts from sneaking in due to the reduction in the visual obscuration angle (θ).



(UNCLASSIFIED)

Figure 5. (U) Wave Visual Obstruction

2 February 2001

00_____ 01_____

I rode the USS GREENEVILLE SSN 772 from Friday, 26 Jan 2001 to Friday, 2 Feb 2001. The following observations are provided in conjunction with that ride.

1) GREENEVILLE is the cleanest and best-preserved SSN I have embarked on during my tour at CSP.
2) The crew's morale is high and the attitude of the wardroom in particular is very positive.
3) Throughout the ship I noted that personnel were very actively engaged in qualification (both submarine qualification and watch station qualification).
4) A very well balanced training program.
    a.) Even though the next major event for the ship is ORSE (20 Feb), I observed Battlestations Torpedo and numerous watch section "Snapshot" evolutions.
    b.) I also observed a STRIKEX.
    c.) I observed a TRACKEX against the USS HENRY M. JACKSON SSBN 730
    d.) I also observed (supported as a monitor) two engineering drill sets a day Saturday and Monday through Wednesday, with an additional engineering drill set on Thursday.
    e.) Sunday was a "drill day off" with various record reviews being the only "work" events planned.
5) I monitored two TLD reads with the new MDR and junior ELT's.
6) Material condition of the ship is very good, but even so, the following items will need correction or resolution prior to deployment:
    a.) The hose on the combined suction of the R-12 plants leaks. This necessitates ventilating the ship approximately every 12 hours to keep R-12 levels below ~40ppm. In addition to repairing the existing hose, the ship is requesting a spare to be taken on deployment. I concur.
    b.) The rudder has developed a "clunking" noise as it passes through 3 degrees right. I would characterize this as a noise problem vice a safety of ship item, but it definitely needs resolution prior to deployment.
    c.) There is a shaft noise (sounds like slip stick) at low RPM that starts after the shaft has been stopped. Shaft staves were replaced during DSRA.
7) When departing San Francisco, the ship took on an indeterminate amount of water through the bridge upper hatch, just prior to rigging the bridge for dive. The exact amount of water was not determined, but there was enough to fill the Control Room to approximately two to three inches. Water poured out of Control Room, through the removable decking in OPS Upper Level and OPS Middle Level, ending up in the Torpedo room. Some water also sloshed forward into the CO and XO Stateroom areas and under the door into the Combat Systems Equipment Space (CSES). This resulted in grounds in Forward Lighting and in one of two independent power supplies to the Ship Control Panel (SCP). Sonar tripped offline (due to wetted equipment cabinets in CSES). Cleaning quickly cleared the Lighting grounds. The SCP grounds, although isolated to one power supply, did not clear and further investigation found damage to two circuit cards in the power supply. These cards were not in ship's on board repair parts. They were ordered and the power supply is anticipated to be repaired shortly upon return to port. The Sonar system was wiped down, inspected and restored in a controlled manner.
   An unfortunate event, (The ship had anticipated the possibility of heavy waves, but had not gotten the hatch closed in time to prevent this event. The hatch was only seconds from being shut when this occurred.), but a good recovery by the ship. Good Damage Control and quick response to the casualty. The ship was never in any danger, but the water certainly got everyone's attention and delayed submerging the ship for about an hour (my best estimate).

I found this ride very useful. I was able to reacquaint my self with the current level of effort our ships employ when getting ready for an ORSE and I was very impressed with the balanced approach taken by the ship to maintain high standards in all mission areas, prepare for a major exam, and yet provide a reasonable approach that would not "burn the crew out" in the process.

Very respectfully,

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Denis E. Buelle

Name: CDR Scott D. WADDLE
Ship: USS GREENEVILLE (SSN 772)

PCO Rank	Sensor Employment	Weapons Employment	Shiphandling	Tactics Coordination	Command Presence	Overall
5/12	AA	A	A	AA	AA	AA

Comments:
Above average tactical ability. Motivating leadership style and positive personality. Always was interested in improving during the course.

-Team focused style of leadership
-Solid command presence
-Intelligent and articulate
-May kill his crew with kindness. To a fault became overly concerned with those receiving constructive criticism.

Overall will take care of his crew. Should create a very positive command climate. Demonstrated that he understands the value of high standards and should enforce those on his ship.

-Above Average performance as a PCO

TORPEDO SHOOTING: 1 HITS 1 MISSES 1 OTHER

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MARE Copy to Z.P WC

corrections made on disk 2/14/01 RGB

Sloan LT NAV 2/14/01

Summary of interview with LT Sloan on 2/14/01

Has been Navigator just over two years.

Left control over one hour before the collision.

Returned to control about 1300, we were something like 13 miles from PH. Went to tell XO, who acknowledged and went to find the CO. XO we need to start thinking about time and distance. Found Captain in his stateroom after walking through middle level ~~and back through control~~. Informed CO who acknowledged. CO went toward control to push the OOD.

Was in control for <u>everything</u> from starting angles until collision when took position to RM room. Did not feel being late PH would be a big deal.

Seems like we are always pressed for time doing DV cruises because we generally get behind schedule.

Relatively standard allotment of time, schedule of events for DVs was standard, always tight but we always make it. Believe most times we have DV cruises we have generally done emergency blows.

General preps for P/D would include brief of evolutions, baffle clear.

There was no brief. CO knew we were running late, no need to continually remind. Apparent he was trying to get things going.

Observed a baffle clear to course 120 was conducted.

Observed XO going into sonar.

CO told OOD to go to P/D on course 120.

Don't remember hearing OOD give CO normal ready for P/D evolution.

Honestly think CO was more directive. Don't believe OOD had opportunity to make ready report. CO was in control entire time and probably had full idea of contact situation

OOD is most slow and methodical officer on board, not easily pushed, meticulous. Probably not the OOD of choice to get to P/D quickly. But, ~~t~~he probably would be if you wanted to get there quickly and correctly.

Ship's practice is to select RACs to sail and turn up volume.

XO instituted a checklist that included selecting Sail Transducers for RACs/WLR-9 and adjusting volume. This was used for training during EPAC May-July 2000.

Only times, EWR would have been on other than OMNI/ALL would be in large contact density. (After at PD/surface)

Tried to look at Periviz while approaching at P/D intermittently ~~looks at.~~ Did not get a really good look due to number of people in control.

Believe CO ~~ordered~~ directed OOD to order 58 feet. Digital Depth gage is a couple feet off.

Recall OOD conduct 3 sweeps, assume low power that is how trained. CO to the scope, recall ~~at #1~~ at least one slower 360° sweep. Don't know what power or specifics of how conducted.

Don't recall sonar acknowledging OOD report of no close contacts. ~~Ship~~ normally sonar acknowledges no close contacts, on occasion has heard sonar acknowledge with "no close contacts"

Time searching with scope very quick. Don't remember any "put me on this contact" type effort during scope time.

~~Not very~~ unsure of exact course

CO called emergency deep. OOD did not initially order a depth. (150' is standard) CO ordered OOD to proceed to 400 feet. OOD ordered bell changed from AII to AI. During CO ordered OOD to come left to the north. ~~OOD ordered course change to 340 feet. About 000~~, CO ordered OOD to put rudder amidships during turn, prior to EB

Heard no reports from sonar or FTOW during period from P/D to 400 feet.

Gut ~~feet~~ Feel was time from P.D to emergency surface was 3-4 minutes.

Observed guest on alarm. and EMBT Blow actuators.

Bell on emergency surface, believe it was AI. ~~as far as I know.~~ Observation of ship on the way up was 13 knots on OSDS display.

As ship was broaching, looked like depth indicator stopped at 90 feet. Felt ship come up after surge, felt a slam. First thought was problem with a ventilation valve recently repaired.

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Knew it was not a usual sound. About 2 seconds later heard a second bang. Did not feel a roll. On the surface it was pretty rough out.

As SWO had a growing feeling that CO was becoming too directive. Very hands on. Specifics of direction, including course and speed, was frustrating. Concern was preparing for deployment that OODs were not learning to be independent enough, grow, and develop, make small mistakes.

This had come up a couple times. Talked with XO, believe he had discussed with CO. Had personally discussed with CO.

During recent exercise with another submarine, CO had been extremely directive. OODs were simply parrots. Saw with two OODs. CO would go back to stateroom but continue to drive the boat off video displays in his stateroom, course changes, rudder to use, etc. Nav was frustrated. Nav discussed with CO. Response was that OODs would learn from the way he was doing it, very important exercise that was the way it would be done.

CO and he had a good relationship, shortly after light levity about CO driving from behind. CO laughed.

Not sure if relevant but wanted to bring it up.

CO was not always that directive. There were situations, like strike exercises, where CO was not directly involved.

Hard to say if he was more directive with JOs than DHs. There had been times he felt ~~very~~ frustrated and saw times WEP was frustrated (by body language).

CO was always directive on angles/dangles, large rudders. Continued that for this event. Nav was OOD before Mr. Coen, CO had not been directive through deep dive.

No reason for him to have a beef with CO, opposite, CO support of him had been great, glowing fitrep. CO had done a lot for the ship. Political animal, smoozed good. Left him generally alone did not micromanage Navigator. Generally a great CO.

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Changes made
Disk 2/14/01

V/C V/NC

Sloan LT NAV 2/11/01

Summary of interview with LT Sloan, USN on 2/11/01
2 years onboard.

Ate lunch about 1215. About 1300 went to control, knew we had a 1400 PH. Found we were dawdling. Went to XO, told him we needed to accelerate. ~~XO went~~ went to CO a few minutes later and told CO we would be late and need to get going. At least 10 miles from PH (maybe 13-14 miles) and still had evolutions to do. CO went to do angles and dangles.

Went back to control, slightly concerned about being 6 or 7 miles from northern edge of boundary. As it turns out always had 2 or 3 mile buffer. Never really an issue at least two miles between buffer and fix expansion. Had to go down one level and around to get back to control because there were too many bodies in control.

ANAV as Nav Sup other than for breaks. Fathometer operator stationed for usual piloting party due to ~~Penjuin~~ Penguin Banks.

CO was driving angles and rudder. Events were going quickly, did not feel talking to CO again would be useful or necessary, a few minutes late would not be a big deal. CO had indicated earlier in morning that he did not want to do an EB, but later changed his mind.

Made preparations for P/D from Northerly course to 120°. Really tough to see Periviz monitor due to crowd in control. OOD did ~~not visit~~ 3 sweeps ~~look~~ and called out no close contacts. Overheard come up to 58 feet for higher look. Layer of VIPs between NAV and CO. NAV up against bulkhead aft.

CO ordered Emergency Deep. Told OOD to continue to 400 feet. Dropped bell to AI from AII. Told OOD to change course to the north.

At 400 feet, don't recall pause or delay before emergency surfacing. Conducted Blow, 20° up, speed peaked at about 13 knots. OSDS depth display froze up at 90 feet. Felt surfacing then pop and bang. Then a few seconds later a second pop and bang, know it was not a normal sound.

CO wanted scope up, > 10 knot. CO directed ~~AZ~~ a backing bell. When speed < 10 knots (NAV reported) raised scope.

ANAV and second QM checked fan room.

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PAGE 1 OF 2

got position from ESLN and went to Radio. Agreed with Radio Supervis that Oprep-3 Navy Blue was required. Stayed until circuit (Sathicom) established and voice report sent. Then returned t

~~Went to Radio Room and ensured comms working the issue. Left and returned to Radio Room with Posit for Oprep 3 Navy Blue~~ ^ Control

#1

Took scope did not see anyone in the water.

^

Ensured comms continued, emphasis on ~~[redacted]~~ data collection for follow-up ~~[redacted]~~ Oprep-3 text report.

Port Plotter manned to plot position of rafts and people, manned by JOs.

No problems with comms with Coast Guard or Sathicom, except one time tried to call Honolulu CG via control room VHF on channel 23 and was unable, called on channel 16. Future comms on 23 fine. W/CSP later monitored freq 2/3 when TWRs reported on the way out.

When asked remembered no chart notes on fishing, just FAD buoys (none close

NAV reported visibility earlier in the day was poor, overcast, kind of whiteout. Especially hard for light colored vessels. Noted contacts earlier. Very hazy out.

NAV reported sea state a little rougher than normal very choppy. Rolling a little at P/D. Rocking while outbound transit.

ASVDU OOC reported by NAV at 0715-0730. Told sonar sup who came out to look at it. (P.O. Holmes or Reyes) Also informed CO prior to underway.

No changes in SOs or Procedures as a result of ASVDV material failure.

When ship went to P/D, XO went to Sonar. Believe it due to ASVDU out of service

Command Climate: Discussed that CO tended to drive ~~junior~~ OODs with very specific direction (rudder angles, speeds, depths etc.) in anything ~~other~~ than normal transit situations. ~~[redacted]~~ Concerned that this was not instilling appropriate decisiveness in the JOs ~~[redacted]~~ and this would be a problem when we deployed. Relayed anecdote regarding a tracking exercise the previous week in which NAV spoke to CO on this subject after noting the involved OODs were "parrots" for the CO, not driving independently. Noted that the CO reacted negatively to these comments.

I considered this as potentially relevant as ~~[redacted]~~ I observed very close direction of the OOD prior to the incident. I cannot say with any degree of certainty that this was a direct factor, but feel it should be considered.